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 Product-process life cycle models are often used to describe long-term
change in organizations. Such models generally assume a deterministic trajectory of
long-run industry evolution and production core transformation that lead to
standardization over time. Typical interpretations of these models do not explain the
short and intermediate term choices and competitive dynamics that lead to the
longer-term changes, or explain viable ‘off-trajectory’ positions and post-stabilization
complications that can arise. In this paper, we use multiple theory streams to
augment discussions of product-process life cycle models in ways that allow
interpretation of the role of uncertainty and management decision-making for the
typical trajectory of standardization as well as off-trajectory and post-standardization
phases.
INTRODUCTION
Organizations respond to environments in a variety of ways, most of them with
implications for the production system. Product lines or services are trimmed or
expanded to match new and emerging patterns of demand. Activities are inter-
nalized or out-sourced in response to shifts in the magnitude and locus of uncer-
tainty, as observed in the automotive and computer industries in the past, and now
in the entertainment and publishing industries. As technological advancements
unfold, and product and market characteristics change, processes are refined or
automated, or abandoned altogether as observed in the steel and textile industries.
Scholars attempting to describe such change frequently rely on two models
derived from Vernon (1966) that represent the changing nature of product and
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process choices over time. The first model, developed by Abernathy (1976) and
Abernathy and Utterback (1978), describes the innovation capacity of the pro-
duction unit as it moves through stages of growth from a small, technology-based
enterprise to a large-volume standard product producer. In this model, product
innovations dominate the change activities of the young organization and the pro-
duction core is kept flexible in order to accommodate these innovations. Over time,
as the focus on innovations shifts toward processes, the production core becomes
increasingly resistant to innovation as incremental process refinements create a
more rigid system. Abernathy’s work inspired the second model, a product-process
matrix developed by Hayes and Wheelwright (1979a, 1979b). Their matrix illus-
trates the critical linkages between the characteristics of the marketplace and the
production core by proposing fits or matches between stages of the product life
cycle (introduction, growth, maturity) and process designs ( job shop, batch, or line
flow).
Both models have been very influential in the development of the operations
and operations strategy research literatures. Both models propose a common path
for product-process evolution. In general, the models argue, an initial period of
market and technological uncertainties encourages frequent product innovations
and appropriately alterable manufacturing capabilities but is followed by the 
emergence of a dominant design. With the dominant design, market and tech-
nological uncertainties decline, market demand increases, product characteristics
become more homogeneous, and process innovations and refinements create rigid,
albeit efficient, production systems capable of low cost manufacture of standard
products.
Both models offer an aggregate treatment of the product-process maturation
process for a typical competitor under a specific set of assumptions, namely that
uncertainty about market size and requirements, resource availability, and product-
process technologies will gradually decline over time. In both models, industry 
evolution results in homogenized customer requirements and a dominant 
product-process design, both of which work to stabilize the resource base. Both
models, in line with their assumptions about industries, generally describe only one
possible path for production core transformation over the long run – from flex-
ibility to efficiency, from low-volume customization to high-volume mass produc-
tion. Figure 1 illustrates the trajectory predicted by product-process life cycle
models.
The traditional prescriptions of the life cycle models do not apply to all indus-
tries or to all firms, however. In some industries (e.g., applications software,
Internet-based retailing, restaurants, printing services), rapid technological change,
irreversibly low entry barriers, or low switching costs allow customers to move
freely among a constantly changing field of competitors, which sustains high
volatility and makes transition to a more certain state virtually impossible. Some
firms initiate or find themselves in off-diagonal positions or niches that support
non-dominant product-process configurations, such as Dell’s development of the
non-traditional, mass customization mail-order business model. Furthermore,
following periods of stability and standardization, industries often undergo a 
revolutionary environmental transformation (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) or a
competence-destroying innovation (Anderson and Tushman, 1990), renewing the
extreme uncertainty of earlier periods and setting in motion processes that lead 
to new product-process configurations, as in the shift from long-line to wireless
communications or the introduction of mini-mill technology to the steel industry.
These aborted transitions along the diagonal, viable off-diagonal positions, and
post-stabilization transformations are not addressed specifically by the product-
process innovation model (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) or the product-process
model (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1979a, 1979b).
We have two main purposes in writing this paper. First, we use multiple theo-
ries in an attempt to explain the underlying dynamics of these product-process
models. Second, we investigate and offer explanations for situations that defy inter-
pretations within a product/process life cycle framework. Such situations include:
Figure 1. Trajectory assumption underlying Abernathy and Utterback (1978) and Hayes and 
Wheelwright (1979a, 1979b) models
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Table I. Change perspectives
Characteristics Application
Life cycle perspective
• Unit of analysis is a firm. • Most interpretations of the process innovation
• Change involves a prefigured sequence of model (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978)
change activities that are regulated by and product-process model (Hayes and
external forces such as institutions or nature Wheelwright, 1979a, 1979b) are made within
(Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). a life cycle framework.
• Change at any one point in time • The programme sequence consists of: (1)
incorporates change(s) from a previous product innovation leading to development
life-cycle stage. of a dominant design that appeals to most
• Event progression is always linear, users, (2) economies of scale for producers of
irreversible, and imposed deterministically. the dominant design that reduces entry by
• The organization’s perception of new innovative competitors, and (3) process
environmental uncertainty is not as innovations that move the production core
important to the change process as the from job shop-like processes to line flow
embedded rules that dictate the sequence. processes, allowing cost reduction and
improvements in efficiencies.
• These life cycle interpretations take a
long range, largely deterministic view of the
production core, with the inevitability of
technological innovation and scale effects
serving as the embedded rules. Although
managers exercise choice in designing
products and processes, their decision task
is to choose how and when to make
appropriate changes that will align the
core with environmental realities.
Dialectical perspective
• Unit of analysis is two opposing entities. • Dialectical conflict can exist between
• The dialectical change framework is built production and the organization, often
on the premise that the entity of interest represented by marketing, and between
exists within an environment of conflict production and the environment. For example,
(Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). As noted by in many organizations, the marketing group,
Zan (1990), a dialectical relationship exists in the face of demand and competitive
between the firm, its internal systems, and uncertainties, attempts to pull production
its environment. toward broader product lines and
• The tension between an entity and its differentiated end-items, while managers
source of conflict can produce one of within production resist movement away
three possible end states: (1) stability, if from standardization (Shapiro, 1977). Similar
the balance of power is equal, (2) dialectical relationships may exist at different
overthrow, if one entity is more powerful, points in time with suppliers, labour groups,
or (3) synthesis of a new entity if one entity and R&D.
forces the change on another. • These dialectical relationships can drive
significant change in the production core over
time as periodic discontinuities between the
environment and the core provoke change
responses. The tension and incongruity
between a job shop production system in
Table I. Continued
Characteristics Application
an environment of increasing standardization 
would be an example of the action of the 
dialectical change model.
Evolutionary perspective
• Unit of analysis is the population of • The evolutionary model is used to explain why
like-firms. some organizations survive and others do not.
• The progression of change activities A firm-level variation that is not consistent
is analogous to the evolution of a with the resource path specified by the
biological population involving a cycle of environment (Ulrich and Barney, 1984) may
variation, selection, and retention (Van de result in failure.
Ven and Poole, 1995). • For example, in some industries, the
• Environmental conditions create selection environment selects those organizations that
mechanisms that isolate one set of are vertically integrated, with firms without
organizations from another, resulting in vertical linkages suffering a competitive
populations of firms with similar resource disadvantage.
profiles and characteristics. • Furthermore, the resource path that the
• As individual firms then produce innovative environment selects may change over time,
changes, they create variations that may or as evidenced by the dominance of vertically
may not be selected positively by the integrated, continuous process mills early in
environment (Baum, 1996). the life of steel manufacturing, followed by the
• Within this framework, the environment dominance of mini-mill technologies in the
defines a resource path that an organization present day.
must follow if it is to be selected for and
survive over time (Hannan and Freeman,
1977; Ulrich and Barney, 1984).
Teleological perspective
• In the teleological change framework, the • Within the production core, changes initiated
entity deliberately takes action to reach an by management in response to threats or
envisioned end state (Van de Ven and opportunities in the environment would be
Poole, 1995). examples of activity of the teleological model.
• Change occurs as a discontinuous sequence • Examples of changes that can be explained
of goal setting, implementation and from a teleological perspective include
adaptation. implementation of manufacturing strategic
• The organization’s environment and plans, just-in-time programmes, continuous
resources constrain what it is able to improvement programmes, quality
accomplish and uncertainties in the certifications, and investments in automation
environment can cause the entity to alter to improve consistency and lower costs.
its change path.
• It is through the managerial action of the
teleological model that the variations and
differences are created among firms, which
can then set off a cycle of variation,
selection, and retention within the 
population of competitors as explained  
by the evolutionary model.
(1) industries and firms that are resistant to emergence of a dominant design and
transition along the diagonal; (2) the potential for viable ‘off-diagonal’ or niche
positions; and (3) the extension of the models to a post-standardization stage.
Throughout this paper, we will draw from Van de Ven and Poole’s (1995) exten-
sive review of change models, in which they identified four basic motors of change:
life cycle, evolutionary, teleological, and dialectical. Table I provides a definition
of each change perspective, with an example of its application to the technical-
production core.
As Van de Ven and Poole (1995) suggest, each change perspective offers an
explanation for the sequence of events that occurs during a change process. Two
of the change perspectives, life cycle and teleological, address change of one entity,
such as an organization or a production core. Two change perspectives, evolu-
tionary and dialectical, describe change of two or more entities, such as a popu-
lation of like-firms or two opposing entities. Furthermore, two of the perspectives
– life cycle and evolutionary – describe change processes as largely deterministic,
with the external environment driving the need for change and dictating the 
characteristics of successful firms. The remaining two perspectives – teleological
and dialectical – acknowledge the role of managerial choice in change efforts,
incorporating more of a postmodern focus on individual organizations and their
idiosyncratic events and capabilities as a basis for change and adaptation (Scott,
1998).
Using the change and development perspectives discussed by Van de Ven and
Poole (1995), we show the interplay of four change perspectives (teleological, evo-
lutionary, life cycle, and dialectical) during early and late stages, and in the criti-
cal transition points initiated by dominant designs and industry transformation.
We approach change as a co-evolutionary process, which is, as described by Lewin
and Volberda (1999), the ‘joint outcome of managerial intentionality, environment,
and institutional effects’ (p. 526).
The life cycle and evolutionary change perspectives are implicit in most inter-
pretations of the Abernathy and Utterback (1978) and Hayes and Wheelwright
(1979a, 1979b) models. By adding dialectical and teleological change perspectives,
we can build on the role of the human actors in the system and enrich our under-
standing of the underlying micro-level dynamics. Whereas the life cycle change
perspective may be used to describe the aggregate industry-level movement toward
standardization over a long time period observed in many industries, the teleo-
logical, evolutionary and dialectical change perspectives allow exploration of the
firm-level product-process choices and the competitive dynamics that develop
within a stage and in the transitions between stages.
Following Lambkin and Day (1989), we use product class as the unit of analy-
sis rather than an industry or a specific product group, but we frame our discus-
sion in terms of (1) the decisions made by management within the individual firms
in the product class, and (2) the behaviour of the populations of firms within the
same product class. Industries are often comprised of a mix of non-competing
products, each product having its own life cycle. Product groups, at the opposite
extreme, represent a specific type of product in a given class – for example, PC
microprocessors classified into product groups according to processor speed.
Because product class reflects both rivalry and new product introductions across
all product groups, it provides a more appropriate, aggregate view of the overall
life cycle pattern (Lambkin and Day, 1989).
A MULTI-LEVEL MODEL OF PRODUCTION CORE CHANGE 
OVER TIME
In our model, an overview of which is illustrated in Figure 2, we integrate the four
change perspectives at different points in the life of a production core in order to
demonstrate not only macro-level interpretations commonly associated with these
models, but micro-level decision making as well, consistent with a post-modern
interpretation. We will organize our presentation in phases: (1) early phase, (2) 
later phase, and (3) reorientation, with particular emphasis on the two transition
points between phases. Throughout, we will attempt to show how the change 
perspectives may be used to explain the interplay and accumulation of changes
over time, for production cores and populations associated with particular pro-
duct classes. We will address the production core within a larger organizational
and environmental system, introducing the conflicts and tensions of the dialectical
perspective. In our discussion, managers are goal directed, take action, and 
make strategy choices, which is consistent with the teleological perspective. The 
innovative strategy choices made by managers create variations among organiza-
tions, whereas imitative strategy choices lead to an increasingly homogeneous 
population. In line with the evolutionary perspective, some of the variations are
selected by the environment and others are not, which results in some organiza-
tional deaths, and a change in the constituents of the population. Some decisions
made by managers are not truly free choice, but are instead constrained and pre-
scribed by basic economics or physics/technology (e.g., state of the art of tech-
nology, economies of scale, scarcities), or imposed by institutional forces (e.g.,
regulatory agencies, international governments), which is consistent with the life
cycle perspective.
Early Phase
In most start-up situations, the environment is characterized by high levels of
uncertainty in aggregate levels of demand and in customer expectations regard-
ing product characteristics, quality, price, and delivery. Resource availability and
supplier capability are also uncertain, and technology options are unproven. Track
records of experience with competitors, which can reveal competitors’ capabilities
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and intentions, do not yet exist. During this early phase, customer expectations
about product designs are poorly understood. These characteristics of a typical
early life of an organization suggest that managers make most decisions under
conditions of extreme uncertainty, particularly with regard to market demand.
The new firm generally focuses its efforts intensely on product development in
order to carve out a position with a small, identifiable group of customers 
(Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Hayes and Wheelwright, 1979a, 1979b).
The earliest years of the personal computer industry provide an illustration of
the uncertainties and typical firm responses in the early phase. During the late
1970s and early 1980s, many new start-ups formed to serve the emerging market
for personal computers. During those years, market and technological uncertainty
was very high, and firms responded with a proliferation of products, with some
firms targeting serious hobbyists, and others targeting emerging home, business,
and game markets. During those years, operating systems, screen appearance, key-
board functionality, and software applications all differed widely, and channels 
of distribution were under formation. Firms focused their energies on products
designed for very specific market niches.
The teleological perspective helps explain the managerial decision-making that
accompanies the prescribed life-cycle trajectory in this phase. According to Clark
(1985), market and technological uncertainty are preconditions for innovation and
change. For innovation and change to occur, managers must face significant ambi-
guity and numerous choices when designing products as well as uncertainty about
which design choices will best satisfy customers (Clark, 1985). This uncertainty
triggers a search and learning process that drives innovation and change (Clark,
1985). The search for alternative innovations under conditions of ambiguity
involves cyclical processes of adaptive learning and goal formulation (Van de Ven
and Polley, 1992), or, expressed in a different way, frequent iterations of product
design and test (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995).
There is an element of randomness to the innovative and adaptive efforts,
however, because when technological and market uncertainty are very high, man-
agers cannot forecast accurately which adaptations and innovations will succeed
in the marketplace (Baum, 1996), consistent with the evolutionary change per-
spective. Those firms that are particularly adept at improvization and experience
are more likely to be more successful in their product development efforts
(Moorman and Miner, 1998).
During this early phase, the dialectical perspective is useful in interpreting deci-
sions about the design of the production core. The market uncertainty of the early
phase, coupled with the firm’s iterative design and test posture, create tension
within the production core. Any efforts to increase scale economies, improve effi-
ciencies, or standardize inputs are generally stopped in the face of high uncer-
tainty about product designs and market requirements. The production core
closely resembles the ‘Marshallian Market Word’ of production described by Salais
and Storper (1992) with the quest for new markets and new product configura-
tions coupled internally with a search for production flexibility and a focus on
economies of scope. Production managers are encouraged to adopt job shop and
small batch production configurations (Woodward, 1958), flexible general-purpose
equipment, with decoupled production stages that allow buffering of each process
stage from uncertainty (Aldrich, 1979).
At the level of the product class, the appearance is of firms producing a wide
range of product variants using a similarly wide range of administrative and 
production structures (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Utterback and Suarez,
1993). During the early phase, new firms and established firms enter the market
in small numbers and make small overall contributions to technological progress
and growth in productivity (Klein, 1977). Anderson and Tushman (1990) charac-
terize this phase as an era of ferment in which firms compete with innovative
product designs, thus creating tremendous variation among the firms in the
product class.
In summary, the many extant product-process variations typical of the early
phase of the product-process life cycle are the by-product of goal-directed man-
agerial choice in a highly uncertain environment, indicating that much of the 
variation observed in the population has its roots in the teleological and dialecti-
cal perspectives. Firms that are able to modify their administrative and produc-
tion structures in response to market and technological change (i.e., those that are
‘generalists’ best suited to volatile environments) will be most likely to survive
(Utterback and Suarez, 1993, p. 5). To the degree that a firm initiates an innova-
tion that is selected positively by investors and customers but is difficult for com-
petitors to imitate, the firm begins to lay the foundation for a competitive
advantage (Barney, 1991). Table II provides a summary of the characteristics of
the early phase and linkages to the change drivers.
Table II. Early phase and alternative change perspectives
Environment High levels of market and technological uncertainty
Teleological perspective In the face of high uncertainty, managers initiate iterative design 
and test as a foundation for adaptive learning and goal 
formulation.
Evolutionary perspective Because of high uncertainty, there is randomness to design efforts.
The process of variation, selection, and retention will result in 
some failures and some successes.
Dialectical perspective There is tension between production’s desire for efficiencies and 
scale and firm’s need for flexibility.
Production core The production core exhibits characteristics of the Marshallian 
implications Market World of Production (Salais and Storper, 1992): small
batch, flexible production, decoupled production stages,
outsourcing of some production stages.
 Transition Period: Dominant Design
The AU and HW models are both firmly rooted in the concept of a dominant
design. The emergence of dominant designs has been observed in a broad range
of industries (see Tushman and Murmann, 1998, for a listing). According to the
original work of Abernathy (1976) and Abernathy and Utterback (1978), a domi-
nant design emerges deterministically as the best compromise among competing
designs, in line with life cycle assumptions about a prescribed sequence of activi-
ties, and serves the needs of a large segment of the market. A dominant design
represents a specific path along an industry’s design trajectory that becomes domi-
nant over other competing design paths (Utterback and Suarez, 1993). The tra-
ditional life cycle interpretation of the HW and AU models is that successful firms
will align with the dominant design, and transition to what Salais and Storper
(1992) describe as the Industrial World of production, or mass production char-
acterized by irreversible investments in economies of scale and process improve-
ments. These life cycle interpretations hold true in many instances. In the early
years of the contact lens industry, for example, many firms employed job-shop-
like production technologies. When the marketplace signalled disposable soft lenses
as the dominant design, firms were required to make substantial investments in
mass production in order to survive (Schifrin and Rich, 1984).
Rather than a purely deterministic process, Anderson and Tushman (1990)
suggest the emergence of a dominant design is an evolutionary process with dialec-
tical undercurrents. In their view, dominant designs ‘are not driven by technical
or economic superiority, but by sociopolitical/institutional processes of compro-
mise and accommodation between communities of interest moderated by eco-
nomic and technical constraints’ (Tushman and Murmann, 1998, p. 244).
Anderson and Tushman (1990) have described the emergence of a dominant
design as a key transition point between an era of ferment and an era of incre-
mental change. Throughout these various discussions of the mechanisms for
forming a dominant design, researchers agree that substantial variation in product
designs and an accumulation of those designs set the stage for the emergence of a
dominant design. A dominant design is, by definition, a population-level or
product class phenomenon since it represents a design that becomes dominant
through its adoption by multiple product class competitors within the population
to serve a large portion of the total market.
Many researchers have acknowledged that emergence of a dominant design is
not an absolute certainty (Tushman and Murmann, 1998; Utterback and Suarez,
1993). Tushman and Murmann (1998) note that dominant designs are unlikely to
form when market volumes are small, customer preferences change frequently (as
in fashion-oriented industries) and when government regulations constrain varia-
tion. A broader interpretation of those conditions would suggest that dominant
designs are unlikely to occur when patents, government regulations, or other entry
barriers prevent the initiation of variations within the population, or at the other
extreme, when competitive behaviour, customer preferences, or geography create
a series of small, fragmented, or unstable markets, thus preventing the accumula-
tion of variations. Furthermore, in some situations, the dominant design emerges as
the only viable alternative for survival (e.g., disk drives), whereas in other situations
the dominant design serves a large segment of the market, but viable niches exist
for non-dominant designs (e.g., office suite software).
Genetically modified plants provide an interesting example of the emergence
of a dominant design. Over the past 20 years, virtually all US seed companies
have employed a soil bacterium to insert genes into the DNA of various crops to
provide herbicide tolerance and pest resistance. As a result, these plants have
moved from the university and corporate laboratories to agricultural fields, and
are planted on millions of hectares. Recently, the US Patent Office issued a broad
patent to Washington University covering the soil bacterium insertion process, 17
years after the original version was filed. The technology is licensed exclusively to
Syngenta and is, as noted by one of the inventors, ‘. . . the basis for practically all
plant genetic engineering these days’ (Stikeman, 2001, p. 31). If a broad patent
had been issued 15 years ago, with an exclusive license to one key competitor, it
is likely the activities of other researchers would have been blocked – resulting in
a new direction for their development efforts, and a failure to accumulate such
strong momentum in support of this technology. While strong patent and intel-
lectual property protection are often cited as promoting innovation, in rapidly
changing industries such as biotechnology such policies may actually stifle the free
flow of innovative ideas (Shulman, 1995) and prevent or delay the accumulation
of variations that result in the emergence of a dominant design.
Teleological and dialectical perspectives. The life cycle and population interpretations
discussed above do not convey the extraordinary uncertainty that managers face
in their decision making during this time period. As noted, extreme uncertainty
about customer requirements and market potential are the precondition for the
search process (Clark, 1985) and the creation of product variations (Tushman and
Murmann, 1998) that lead to the emergence of the dominant design. Except in
those cases where government regulations create a clearly defined standard, the
emergence of the dominant design will likely occur unpredictably. For product
class incumbents, the uncertainty of the early phase makes it difficult to discern
the emergence of a dominant design – to recognize that one combination of design
attributes is beginning to develop broad-based market appeal. Even when an
incumbent recognizes the emergence of an apparent dominant design, manage-
ment must make decisions whether to align with the dominant design, as well as
the timing of the alignment. All of these decisions are characterized by uncer-
tainty and conflicting expectations imposed by customers, marketing, operations,
and technology management. As exemplified by Sony’s failure to recognize VHS
as the dominant design in video formats, even sophisticated, well-established firms
have difficulty recognizing an emerging dominant design that works against the
established beliefs of management.
A firm may lead or follow the emergence of the dominant design, reject the
dominant design altogether, or miss out by trying to align too late with the domi-
nant design. Suarez and Utterback (1995) note that firms may have some lever-
age in enforcing their product as the dominant design when they possess collateral
assets such as market channels, brand image or high switching costs. A firm may
also have increased opportunity to have its product serve as the dominant design
when it is able to manoeuvre into a position that generates large volumes (Suarez
and Utterback, 1995), as in the case of government contracts or extensive network
relationships that lead to early scale effects. In introducing Windows, Microsoft
used its position with DOS as a collateral asset in striking contracts with computer
makers to position its new product as the dominant design. Other firms, lacking
those resources, are generally followers along the dominant design trajectory and
become imitators of the notable successes of the lead firm. They, in essence, begin
the transition to price-based, commodity-like competition when they imitate rather
than innovate in their pursuit of market share.
Some firms, when faced with evidence of an emerging dominant design, may
choose to jump off of the trajectory, either dropping the product altogether or
moving to a niche that is not served by the dominant design. In the early 1980s,
Intel was producing a dynamic random access memory (DRAM) chip. During
those years, Intel observed that the dominant design was allowing entry by new
competitors who had little design capability but were highly competent in low-cost
production. The price erosion and lack of differentiation that accompanied the
emergence of a dominant design caused Intel to deliberately withdraw from that
product segment and focus its energies on other product categories where product
design capability continued to have value (Burgelman and Grove, 1996). Similarly,
in the late 1980s, Apple Computer rejected the dominant DOS/Windows design,
adamantly adhering to its proprietary operating system. In order to survive, it iden-
tified niche markets and applications (e.g., desktop publishing, architectural design)
where its product provided performance far superior to that of the dominant
design. Similarly, Geoworks was a successful developer of operating systems soft-
ware and one of the first developers of a graphical user interface for Intel-based
computers. When Microsoft began to dominate the PC market, Geoworks was
able to survive by finding viable niches in operating systems designed for 
hand-held computing devices and other consumer electronics (Savitz, 1996).
For firms that elect an off-diagonal niche position, they continue to operate in a
Marshallian Market World of Production, characterized by continued high 
levels of market uncertainty and flexible production systems designed for rapid
development of new products and service to niche markets (Salais and Storper,
1992).
Because of environmental uncertainty, indecisiveness, or a lack of resources and
capability, firms may move too early or too late to align with the dominant design,
poor timing that will likely lead to failure. Ashton-Tate, the maker of the dBase
database software that dominated the market in the 1980s, failed to prepare effec-
tively for the emergence of integrated office suites. It lacked the more extensive
product development skills needed to compete with suites, and was unsuccessful
in developing those capabilities through acquisition. Even though its position with
dBase could have provided powerful switching costs and an opportunity to lock-
in some parts of the emerging office suite market, it was unable to make the tran-
sition to that emerging dominant design.
The range of these decision options and possible outcomes illustrates the inter-
play between teleological and dialectical perspectives, as choice is influenced by
the expectations of different functional groups within the organization and pres-
sures from the external constituents. As noted by Burgelman (1994), changes in
strategy are subject to strong inertial forces. Organizational history, emotional
attachment, and bounded rationality can distort the decision-making process
(Burgelman, 1994), causing the organization to ignore the signals of an imminent
dominant design or to make ill-timed and ill-formed strategic choices. The con-
tributions of the evolutionary, teleological and dialectical perspectives to the domi-
nant design phenomenon are summarized in Table III.
Later Phase
With adoption of a dominant design, the population of firms that adopted the
design moves from an era of ferment to an era of incremental change (Anderson
and Tushman, 1990). For firms that follow the dominant design, the later phase is
generally characterized by lower levels of uncertainty in demand, resources, tech-
nology and competitor behaviour. The dominant design achieves wide market
acceptance (Utterback and Suarez, 1993), which reduces demand or market uncer-
tainty. The standardization that results from acceptance of the dominant design
reduces technological and resource uncertainty. Although competitive intensity
remains high, the uncertainty associated with competitor actions is reduced as
competitors move toward the dominant design. The locus of competition shifts
toward acquiring scale economies and achieving cost reductions. The scale effects
provide an incentive for even new entrants to align with the dominant design
(Utterback and Suarez, 1993). In general, organizations following the dominant
design have more knowledge about the expectations of customers, the successful
practices of key competitors, and the roles of other institutional forces, such as
regulatory groups.
During this phase, the life cycle interpretations of the HW and AU models high-
light the predictable trajectory toward process standardization. The HW model
proposes that firms shift from flexible, small batch processes toward more efficient,
larger volume line-flow processes in order to capitalize on product standardiza-
tion, in line with Salais and Storper’s (1992). Industrial World of production. The
AU model notes that the shift toward standardized production techniques is
accompanied by an emphasis on process innovations in order to encourage higher
levels of efficiency and further cost reductions. Product innovations, which were
the hallmark of the early phase, fade in importance as process innovations become
essential to further cost reductions and ‘optimization’ of the production system
(Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). One of the key contributions of the AU model
is to note that the movement toward standardized, high volume production often
Table III. Dominant design and alternative change perspectives
Evolutionary perspective Teleological and dialectical perspectives
(three possible outcomes of
variation, selection, and
retention)
Insufficient variation or insufficient
accumulation of variations = no dominant
design
Sufficient variation and accumulation
within dominant segment = dominant 
design with some viable off-diagonal market 
niches
Sufficient variation and accumulation
applied to total market = dominant design 
as only viable evolutionary path
• High market and technological uncertainty
• Continued design and test, with search for market
niches
• Continued focus on production core flexibility
(Marshallian Market World of Production (Salais
and Storper, 1992))
• Reduced market and technological uncertainty
• Increased internal tension and uncertainty about
existence of dominant design, and whether and
when to align
• Choice to adopt dominant design moves
production core along the diagonal toward
dedicated inflexible structure focused on economies
of scale and efficiencies (Industrial World of
Production (Salais and Storper, 1992))
• Choice to reject the dominant design commits
production core to continued flexible production
within market niche (Marshallian Market World of
Production (Salais and Storper, 1992))
• Reduced market and technological uncertainty
• Increased internal tension and uncertainty about
existence of dominant design, and whether and
when to align
• Choice to adopt dominant design moves
production core along the diagonal toward
dedicated inflexible structure focused on economies
of scale and efficiencies (Industrial World of
Production (Salais and Storper, 1992))
• Choice to reject dominant design and exit the
product class



creates a rigid core that is resistant to further product innovations (Abernathy and
Utterback, 1978).
The teleological change perspective sheds light on the strategic choices that
motivate production core behaviour in the later phase, particularly the transition
toward rigidity (Child, 1997). In contrast to the early phase where uncertainty
drove the search process that led to product-process variations, in the later phase,
the reduced uncertainty and emergence of a dominant design results in more
informed strategy choices that are less likely to be life-threatening. Managerial
decision-marking in this phase is characterized by a rational search for efficiency
in the production of the dominant design, since cost competition will be increas-
ingly important (Utterback and Suarez, 1993). Managers take full advantage of
their more certain environment and initiate tighter linkages between production
stages, as is typical of automated line flow processes. Once those capital-intensive
line processes are in place, organization priorities shift to full utilization in order
to achieve efficiencies. Therefore, changes in processes are oriented toward
enhancing efficiency. Changes and modifications that interfere with utilization are
resisted, because the human actors adhere to the rules embedded in the process
technology (Child, 1997). The production core becomes increasingly rigid to inno-
vations of any kind because change threatens the stability. There are many exam-
ples of firms and product classes in this situation. Synthetic fibres, including nylon,
polyester, and olefins used for various fabric, carpet and industrial applications,
are produced in large continuous process plants that are completely ill-equipped
to handle product variety or significant product innovations.
Faced with intense competition but armed with more information about the
successes and failures of competitors, some firms economize on search costs (Cyert
and March, 1963) and imitate the actions of other successful organizations
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993). In addition to similar product
designs, firms will imitate process improvements and organizational innovations.
Just-in-Time, Total Quality Management, and team-based production structures
are examples of process and organizational innovations that have been imitated
extensively.
Researchers have observed that organizations tend to move through protracted
periods of stability when environmental uncertainty is relatively low (Gersick,
1991; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). During stable periods, firms often make
minor incremental changes but, for the most part, follow a consistent approach
(Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Gersick, 1991; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985).
Their successes reinforce a particular way of doing business, which lends validity
to the existing strategies, systems, and structures, further reinforcing those deci-
sions and behaviours (Gersick, 1991). As long as the environmental premises
underlying the stategies, systems, and structure continue to hold, there is no incen-
tive for the firm to make a significant change in its way of doing business. The
firm continues to make minor refinements that draw it into closer alignment with
key customers and suppliers, and that imitate and preempt the routine moves of
competitors. These minor adaptations create a deep structure (Gersick, 1991) that
becomes resistant to change. Furthermore, during this period of stability, man-
agers further reinforce their mental models about how the industry operates and
how the organization should work (Walsh, 1995).
In this later phase, the improvization and flexibility typical in the early-phase
product-process actions (Moorman and Miner, 1998) are suppressed by the
increasingly embedded practices and routines of the production core (Dougherty
and Heller, 1994). As represented by Child (1997), the strategic choices are more
likely to make use of predetermined mental models. Organizations use established
search routines to garner information (Lant and Mezias, 1992), therefore strategic
issue diagnosis is less reflective and more automatic (Dutton, 1993), further per-
petuating a sameness to decision making over time. As fewer changes are intro-
duced by the human actors, the production core becomes more of an objective
structural component of the organization (Orlikowski, 1992). Put into an institu-
tional perspective, the current product/process configuration takes on a ‘taken-for
granted’ status (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
In some cases, the market demands new products and innovations that are
refused by the large volume, standard product producers. By ignoring these
requests, the product class incumbents open the door for new entrants. For
example, Fiber Innovation Technologies (FIT) is a small synthetic fibre producer
that exists on the fringes of the commodity fibre industry. FIT uses batch processes
and flexible equipment to make small lots of specialty shaped fibres for high-end
applications. Volumes are too small and production technology too uncoupled and
inefficient to attract the interests of the commodity synthetic fibre producers.
This phase is not without the tensions and conflicts illuminated by the dialecti-
cal perspective. Many of the internal constituents that had advocated the product
innovations and flexibility of the early phase, such as the marketers and product
designers, are likely to continue to initiate innovative changes. As Shapiro (1977)
has noted, there is a predictable set of conflict areas that exist between marketing
and production as marketing seeks product variety and custom solutions while 
production seeks standardization and large volumes. As noted by Dougherty 
(1992, p. 179), ‘Departments are like different “thought worlds”, each focusing on
different aspects of technology-market knowledge, and making different sense 
of the total. Organization routines separate rather than coordinate the thought
worlds.’ Because significant product changes are costly and they threaten existing
processes, systems, and powerful managers, they are likely to be resisted (Miller,
1993). Management innovations, which have difficult-to-measure benefits,
are likely to be resisted as well (Kimberly, 1981). Whereas in the early phase 
the dialectical tensions precipitated changes, in the later phase, the dialectical 
tensions exist but are unlikely to bring about significant disruption to the stability
of the core.
Relationships with external constituents would likely show a reduction in dialec-
tical tensions from the early phase. Institutional theory stresses that organizations
must conform with the norms of their environments if they are to receive support
and resources (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In the first early phase, conformity to the
expectations of constituent groups is difficult, because uncertainty is so high that
organizations do not have a target for imitative and alignment efforts. In the later
phase, the norms established by customers, suppliers, regulatory bodies, and finan-
cial institutions would be more apparent and easily adopted. As Meyer and Rowan
(1977) have noted, ‘independent of their productive efficiencies, organizations
which exist in institutional environments and succeed in becoming isomorphic with
the environment gain legitimacy and resources needed to survive’ (p. 352).
The interplay between the teleological and evolutionary perspectives is illus-
trated in the population dynamics of this phase. From the point of view of the
evolutionary change perspective, as competitors facing reduced uncertainty elect
to make the transition to mass production, and as that successful variation is then
retained, the surviving organizations will begin to take on a certain similarity in
strategy and resource profile (Baum, 1996). The tendency toward imitative strate-
gic choices and alignment with industry norms would encourage homogeneity
rather than variation, manifesting itself as mimetic isomorphism at the population
level (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The trend toward increasing similarity among
firms is supported by institutional theory. Consequently, the evolutionary cycle of
variation, selection, and retention will play very little role during a protracted
period of industry predictability or convergence (Gersick, 1991).
These periods of population-wide inertia may be observed in several industries.
In the US automobile industry in the 1970s, all three of the big US auto-makers
had formed very similar fixed assumptions about what customers wanted, made
tremendous investments in similar rigid production cores, and formed tight links
to suppliers (including vertical integration) and the dealer network. Rather than
initiating significant innovations of any kind, which, in their eyes, would have been
risky and unnecessary, they made minor incremental changes that resulted in a
high level of similarity among firms and, in a relatively certain environment,
ensured survival. Table IV summarizes the evolutionary, teleological, and dialec-
tical change perspectives for the later stage, as well as the production core 
implications.
Transition Period: Shock and Reorientation
Significant environmental shifts are often referred to as environmental jolts or
Schumpeterian shocks (Barney, 1991; Schumpeter, 1934). Examples of shocks
include the emergence of new competitor groups, shifts in technology, and sub-
stantial changes in market demand – all examples of a return to extreme levels 
of uncertainty. According to Tushman and Anderson (1986), a competence-
destroying or competence-enhancing discontinuity – a form of shock – creates
technological uncertainty and obsolescence of extant product and process skills in
firms, often resulting in new dominant designs (Tushman and Anderson, 1986).
Research by Christensen and Rosenbloom (1995) shows that incumbent firms are
often the initiators of new competence-destroying innovations, when those inno-
vations address the needs of existing customers. These innovations often generate
a new dominant design, which can fundamentally disrupt existing production
cores. On the other hand, Christensen and Rosenbloom (1995) found that a radical
technological substitute that displaces existing competitors, rendering product,
processes, and technological capabilities obsolete, is more likely to come from 
a new entrant. Some shocks, such as those created by disruptive substitute 
technologies, are of such magnitude that they jeopardize the existence of organi-
zations and entire populations (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995). Several
industries are susceptible to these kinds of shocks now. In telecommunications, for
example, new optical fibres are being developed from high performance plastics
with the potential to displace glass. Similarly, there are new emerging technologies
for optical switches used in broadband communications, with some companies
making commitments to micro-mirrors and others developing polymers with
optical selectivity. These new technological innovations have the potential to dis-
place existing technologies as well as the companies who make them.
Whether the shock is endogenous or exogenous in origin is an important dis-
tinction because of the implications for uncertainty and management decision-
making. Using the framework developed by Milliken (1987), uncertainty may be
conceptualized as state uncertainty, effect uncertainty, and response uncertainty.
 Table IV. Later phase and alternative change perspectives
Environment Reduced market and technological uncertainty
Teleological perspective With reduced uncertainty, decisions and strategies first become more 
informed, then more reflexive. Reduced need to scan environment 
leads to entrenched mental models and deep structure. Failure to 
recognize impending shocks.
Evolutionary perspective Imitation among competitors and tacit agreement to participate in 
marginal change activities leads to homogeneity. Few variations 
initiated.
Dialectical perspective Departments become more decoupled and autonomous, resisting 
changes initiated by the other. Reduced dialectical conflict as firm 
reaches harmony with its external constituents. Failure to bring 
controversial information into the debate.
Production core Continuous refinement of coupled processes, leading to efficiency and
implications rigidity. Objective is to reduce costs and develop closer alignments 
with customers and suppliers. Focus on process improvements, with 
resistance toward product changes.
In the event of an endogenous shock – e.g., a competence-destroying innovation
that originates within the product class – firms are likely to be aware of the exis-
tence of the pending disruption, but may be uncertain as to the effect it will have
on their organizations or the response they should take. In the event of an exoge-
nous shock, firms are often completely unaware of the impending threat and fail
to recognize the evidence that would have provided the clues. In that case, state
uncertainty is high and, consequently, effect and response uncertainty are similarly
extremely high.
Teleological and dialectical perspectives on shock. According to Meyer (1982), an organi-
zation’s ability to anticipate a shock is determined by the aggressiveness of the orga-
nization’s environmental scanning activity. Furthermore, the organization’s ability
to respond to a shock is influenced by the interdependencies that are institutional-
ized through its structure and process (Meyer, 1982). During the maturity stage,
organizations will have become accustomed to lower levels of uncertainty, which
reduces their interest and involvement in aggressive environmental scanning and
their ability to accurately anticipate a shock (Meyer, 1982). Organizations with
adaptive search routines are better equipped to respond to significant environ-
mental change (Lant and Mezias, 1992).
In the period leading up to a shock, the deep structure and the entrenched
mental models can prevent managers from recognizing impending environmental
uncertainties. Even when new uncertainties are recognized, managers are often
reluctant or unable to initiate changes because of the dominance of the deep struc-
ture. The longer the period of stability and inertia, the more rigid the organiza-
tion is to change and the more susceptible it becomes to a significant shock (Barron
et al., 1994; Ingram, 1993). For example, the demand and technology shift toward
a networked-PC configuration provided a significant shock to minicomputer
makers. Similarly, the move toward warehouse-style superstore retailing caught
department store retailers off guard. In both cases, the industries had undergone
a relatively long period of stability, which had reinforced existing models of cus-
tomer and competitive behaviour. As noted by Christensen (1997), managers often
choose inappropriately in the context of a disruptive innovation by ignoring or
resisting its adoption. For several years, Kodak resisted the transition from 
photochemical film and camera technology toward digital technology, which
caused a late shift to that new paradigm.
In addition to mental models and organizational deep structure, institutional
forces work against recognition of new environmental uncertainties. Firms develop
networks of interdependencies with competitors, suppliers, and associations, which
enhance legitimacy in the initial stages but become sources of inertia and inflex-
ibility (Abrahamson and Fombrun, 1994) when the environment once again begins
to exhibit uncertainty. The institutional processes that helped ensure legitimacy
and access to resources in the early phase may cause firms to fail to exercise full
strategic choice (Oliver, 1991) and to be constrained in their ability to change
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powell, 1991).
The steel industry may be used to illustrate this phenomenon. The continuous
process steel mills, most of which are large scale and vertically integrated, made
those strategy and structure choices in the face of relatively low uncertainty with
respect to demand, technology, and competition during the 1940s, 50s, and 60s.
As technology, competitive, and demand uncertainties increased in the 1980s
(foreign steel imports, emergence of mini-mill technologies, and slowing demand),
the continuous mills were too entrenched with their investments and networks of
relationships to make changes in a timely fashion. Table V provides an overview
of the teleological perspectives on the shock process.
Teleological and dialectical perspectives on reorientation. Following an endogenous or
exogenous shock, firms generally undergo a period of upheaval and a return to
an ‘era of ferment’ (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). The unexpected emergence
of a substitute good from another industry, for example, could increase demand
uncertainty to levels reminiscent of the early phase. Alternatively, the arrival of a
competence-destroying innovation could initiate a return to the technological
uncertainty absent since the emergence of a dominant design.
It is tempting to treat production core change during revolutionary environ-
mental periods as merely a special case of the early phase. During the early phase,
an organization’s production core reflects the uncertainties its managers have
about their environment and their firm’s place in it. As a reorientation period is
by definition one in which environmental (market, technology, competitive) uncer-
tainties are extreme, an obvious implication is that managers may attempt to
return to a flexible product-process configuration more compatible with that
uncertainty, in essence returning to the Marshallian World of Production (Salais
and Storper, 1992). Our synthesis leads us to argue, however, that this conclusion
is overly simplistic.
The principal difference between managing during the early phase and man-
aging in a reorientation phase is that during the early phase managers are funda-
mentally unconstrained by factors either internal or external to the organization.
At the firm’s outset, as described earlier, managers pursue innovative strategy
choices as they try to find and occupy a niche within the environment. Only 
when this niche is occupied do other goals, such as satisfying the needs of a broader
base of organizational constituents, become urgent (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).
Thus, organizational inertia is virtually non-existent during a start-up phase,
and managers are free to configure the production core as required by the 
circumstance.
During a reorientation phase, however, managers are constrained. They are
limited by inertia (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983) and by the relationships the orga-
nization has developed over its life. The production core has become rigid to 
substantive change, for example, since such change disrupts the efficiencies that
resulted from a protracted pattern of investment and refinement (Abernathy and
Utterback, 1978; Gersick, 1991). As discussed in the later phase, the mature orga-
nization has developed and optimized a variety of relationships with external con-
stituents – e.g., suppliers or customers – whose desires and needs may not have
changed from the later stage (Utterback and Suarez, 1993). Managing production
Table V. Discontinuities/shock and reorientation
Evolutionary Teleological and dialectical Teleogical and dialectical perspectives on 
perspective perspectives on shock post-shock reorientation
Exogenous shock to • Return to extreme market • Institutional relationships restrict exercise
product class, e.g., and technological of full strategic choice about how and
competence- uncertainty (state, effect, when to respond.
destroying innovation and response), but many • Entrenched mental models cause
developed by new incumbents do not managers to fail to recognize 
entrant or substitute recognize consequences. uncertainties and to apply old models to
product class or other • Firms with entrenched inappropriate decision.
external factors mental models fail to scan • Uncertainty creates internal conflict and
provoked by environment aggressively distrust between groups, which delays
economic, political, or leading to unrecognized decision making.
ecological conditions signals, and delays in • High levels of organizational inertia.
recognizing shock. • Firms ultimately face decision of moving
• Firms that are positioned quickly to a new dominant design
in more uncertain niches employing very different production core
may be better prepared to characteristics.
recognize a shock. • Inability or reluctance to adjust
production core to new conditions
may result in forced exit or protracted
performance problems.
Endogenous shock to • Return to high levels of • Choices about whether and when to 
product class, e.g., market and technological move to new dominant design are
competence- uncertainty (effect and constrained by networks of existing
destroying innovation response). institutional relationships.
developed by an • Firms generally anticipate • Reluctant return to iterative search and
incumbent the shock even if there is test mode of earlier developmental
uncertainty about effect period. Increased internal tension and
and response. uncertainty about existence of a new
• Delays in making dominant design, and whether and
important transitions when to align.
opens up opportunities • Choice to adopt the new dominant
for new entrants. design moves production core backward
along the diagonal toward more flexible
structure capable of adapting to
uncertainty surrounding new conditions.
• Choice to reject the new dominant design
forces firm into a niche position that may
or may not be viable.
core change through a reorientation period, therefore, involves balancing the
demands of these constituents – or terminating the organization’s relationship with
them – with the environmental realities of the new era. Organizations are not free
to exercise full strategic choice. Clearly, then, both the teleological and dialectical
perspectives may be used to explain production core transformation through a
reorientation period.
The transition of Kodak from photochemical to digital imaging technology pro-
vides a compelling illustration of the difficulty of reorienting within an existing
framework of constituents. One of the key strengths of the Kodak Corporation over
the last several decades has been the Kodak brand name, which was represented 
to the consumer through the extensive network of film developing outlets that
employed the Kodak system of film development. In the face of a competence-
destroying innovation that undermined its film and conventional camera business,
Kodak initially continued to incorporate those retail outlets in its digital strategy.
The company envisioned a model in which consumers would take photographs with
a digital camera, but have the image perfected and printed through the established
retail outlets. Through innovations by other digital imaging companies, such as 
Sony and Hewlett Packard, customers are increasingly able to use their personal
computers and printers to print a hard copy of a photo. Consequently, the role of
Kodak’s existing retail network is becoming much less important – forcing Kodak
to rethink its adaptation to the new world of digital imaging once again. Not only
has Kodak been forced to rethink its production core and traditional organizational
competencies, it must rethink everything about its branding and distribution to cus-
tomers and possibly sever some important relationships of the past. Industry bound-
aries have been redefined to include other consumer electronic and printer
companies who do not have a long tradition and large resource investment in pho-
tochemical photography, as well as many new markets opportunities that extend
beyond traditional photography.
As illustrated by Kodak, the production core that emerges post shock is a reflec-
tion both of the characteristics of the new environment (Tushman and Romanelli,
1985) and the balance struck between new and/or altered organization-constituent
relationships and those relationships that remain unchanged from the maturity
period (Cyert and March, 1963). Early in their reorientation responses, organiza-
tions are subject to the liability of newness inasmuch as reconfigured production
cores will not have been validated by institutional entities (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994).
As illustrated by Kodak, although at least some expertise that was valuable in the
old environment is still valuable in the new, managers are forced to scan unfamil-
iar sectors, learn new techniques and develop new relationships after revolution-
ary environmental change (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) and to return to the
iterative design and test modality of the early phase.
During the pre-shock, later phase, which was characterized by convergence and
stability, organizations tend to hire and promote individuals who are compatible
with that environment. They institute formal communication and planning
processes, which tend to isolate departments from each other and to force linear,
sequential handling of information and decision-making. As a consequence,
organization culture and structure is mismatched with the new post-shock en-
vironmental realities. After a shock, firms are forced to recreate flexible intra-
organizational linkages, such as informal, adaptive communications between 
marketing and production, and to place individuals who cope well with uncer-
tainty in key management positions. The speed and completeness of these cultural
and structural changes influence the success of reorientation. In some cases, the
transition may not be possible within the existing organization structure and
culture – and a new business unit may be created to address the new realities.
Christensen (1997) recommends that the new digital photography opportunities
before Kodak be developed in a completely different organizational unit – not in
the mainstream business. If developed in the mainstream business, he argues, the
company is likely to use digital photography to strengthen the current business
model and possibly jeopardize the new market applications.
Firms that survive a shock are likely to be closer aligned with their environment
(Meyer, 1982) and thus better prepared to reorient. The firms that are most likely
to be aware of the impending shock are those that have avoided protracted con-
vergence, complacency, and inertia. Ironically, those firms could be poor per-
formers who are forced to aggressively scan the environment to ensure survival,
recent entrants who have yet to adapt fully to industry norms, or firms involved
in aggressive strategic behaviour (niche participants) at the industry boundaries.
When the automotive industry suffered a series of life-threatening shocks in the
1970s, analysts believed Ford, a marginal performer even before the shock, would
not survive into the 1980s. General Motors, on the other hand, was in a strong
position. Instead, Ford, with little to lose, was able to reorient itself more aggres-
sively and more successfully than General Motors, which was the quintessential
example of an inertial firm in the throes of convergence.
The characteristics of the production core following the shock depend on the
type of shock experienced. As described, some discontinuities create a disturbance
that is, for the most part, localized at the level of the production core, as is often
the case with an endogenous shock. New dominant designs require new process
technologies and possibly new supplier relationships, but the existing base of cus-
tomers, most other external constituents, and the core technological capabilities
remain intact. When the effects of the shock can be contained to the production
core, many organizations can successfully transform themselves in line with the
new market and technological demands, as some continuous process mills were
able to do with mini-mill technology in the steel industry. Even so, some will resist
the reorientation and fail. Consequently, following even a production-core local-
ized shock, the number and characteristics of the organizations in the population
will change.
When the shock is more profound, as with most exogenous shocks, threatening
to destroy the link between the firm and its customer and technological base,
survival is less likely. Following a shock of this magnitude, most incumbent firms
will fail to make a successful reorientation. The population will no longer exist as
the accumulation of a pattern of selected variations. Those firms that survive will
do so by identifying viable niches elsewhere, resulting in a virtual dissipation of
the former population. As noted by Utterback (1996) and by Christensen (1997),
following the introduction of a substitute, or disruptive, technology, rarely do
incumbent firms make a successful transition to the new paradigm. The teleologi-
cal and dialectical perspectives on reorientation following a shock are shown in
Table V.
CONCLUSIONS
Encouraged by the extensive use by and importance of product-process models to
academics and managers, we attempted to provide a richer interpretation of
product-process models and to offer explanations aimed at extending conceptual
and empirical research. For our organizing framework, we used Van de Ven and
Poole’s (1995) perspectives on organizational change and development. Combin-
ing these perspectives offered distinct advantages in examining the multi-level
nature of process-product models and allowed us to reconcile disparate interpre-
tations across streams of research. In addition, integrating perspectives of change
and organization helped to explain multi-level organizational outcomes that are
not currently discussed in the literature on product-process models, including
viable off-diagonal positions, product classes that fail to evolve through the various
phases, and post-standardization effects.
We began this paper by discussing how product-process models interpret the
evolution of products and processes as a deterministic trajectory, shaped in large
measure by environmental uncertainties, which is most consistent with a life cycle
perspective of organizational change and development. Focusing on the produc-
tion cores within a given product class as our principal unit of analysis, we dis-
cussed the interplay of micro- and macro-level processes that occur over time. As
products and processes pass through the phases of a life cycle trajectory, organi-
zational populations cycle through periods of variation, selection and retention
consistent with the evolutionary perspective. By emphasizing that the production
core is a social system, created by human actors and modified and/or maintained
by their actions, we then showed how micro-level processes involving managerial
choice (teleological perspective) and conflict (dialectical perspective) act to better
explain the dynamics that occur within and between phases of product-process
models. By explaining the managerial and institutional roles and effects at each of
the stages of the product-process life cycles, we were able to explain and interpret
the two pivotal transition points in the life of any product class: emergence of a
dominant design, and the reorientation that accompanies an endogenous or exoge-
nous shock to the product class.
Our work suggests research opportunities to examine the many links between
levels, and within or across phases, during product-process evolution. For example,
studies examining the roles of human actors in new product and process devel-
opment could be extended in future research to incorporate their effect on how
organizations decide whether and when to follow the dominant design, and how
well an organization or production core sustains or fails to sustain a shock. Simi-
larly, research attention should be focused on those organizations occupying posi-
tion that defy the predictions of product-process evolution models and their
attendant dialectical and teleological processes. Although beyond the scope of this
study, it is important that related research examine the importance of industry dif-
ferences in explaining product-process evolution. For example, Eisenhardt et al.
(1977) describe the importance of maintaining dialectical processes in strategic
choices in a high velocity industry. Another related opportunity is to study the orga-
nizational effects of shock when a single product and product core are affected.
Do firms with diverse product offerings fare better than those that offer very similar
products? As we suggested, are marginal or niche players that were unable or
unwilling to adopt the dominant in the earlier period more likely to survive a
shock? Given the current trend toward consolidation and return to core lines of
business, this is an enticing research question.
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